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Abstract
Offchain networks provide a promising solution
to overcome the scalability challenges of cryp-
tocurrencies. However, design tradeoffs of of-
fchain networks are still not well-understood to-
day. In particular, offchain networks typically
rely on fees-based incentives and hence require
mechanisms for the efficient discovery of “good
routes”: routes with low fees (cost efficiency)
and a high success rate of the transaction rout-
ing (effectiveness). Furthermore the route dis-
covery should be confidential (privacy), and
e.g., not reveal information about who trans-
acts with whom or about the transaction value.
This paper provides an analysis of the “search
friction” of route discovery, i.e., the costs and
tradeoffs of route discovery in large-scale of-
fchain networks in which nodes behave strategi-
cally. As a case study, we consider the Lighning
network and the route discovery service pro-
vided by the trampoline nodes, evaluating the
tradeoff in different scenarios also empirically.
Finally, we initiate the discussion of alternative
charging schemes for offchain networks.
1 Introduction
Despite the high popularity of cryptocurrencies, it re-
mains a challenge to make fast payments at scale. This
is mainly due to the inefficiency of the underlying consen-
sus protocol: it can take several minutes until a transac-
tion went through a full consensus and can be confirmed.
A promising solution are emerging payment channel net-
works such as the Lightning network, which allow to per-
form transactions off-chain and in a peer-to-peer fashion:
without requiring consensus on the blockchain. In a nut-
shell, a payment channel is a cryptocurrency transaction
which escrows or dedicates money on the blockchain for
exchange with a given user and duration. Users can also
interact if they do not share a direct payment channel:
they can route transactions through intermediaries.
However, the design of secure and scalable offchain
networks is challenging and still not well-understood. In
particular, these networks must not only be scalable but
also account for strategic (i.e., selfish) user behavior; it
must further be ensured that these networks do not in-
troduce new security issues. A common approach to
incentivize network nodes (the intermediaries) to con-
tribute to the transaction routing is to use a fee-based
mechanism: intermediaries can charge nodes which route
through them a nominal fee. This is also the approach
taken in the Lightning network which serves us as a case
study in this paper.
This raises the question of how nodes can discover
routes through intermediaries. One aspect here is cost
efficiency: since different routes come at different fees,
nodes require scalable mechanisms to find “short” (i.e.,
low-cost) routes. However, routes do not only have to
be cheap but also provide sufficient liquidity to route
the transaction: the route discovery mechanism should
ensure a high success rate of the transaction routing; this
property is known as effectiveness in the literature. Ef-
fectiveness is not only a performance concern: a lengthy
discovery process may also jeopardize privacy, poten-
tially leaking information about who aims to transact
(i.e., find a route) with whom. Last but not least, the
route discovery should be incentive-compatible, e.g., ac-
count that nodes are only willing to distribute routes
from which they can benefit (e.g., which go through
themselves).
Providing an effective and scalable route discovery is
particularly challenging as large-scale off-chain networks
are expected to be highly dynamic, e.g., due to the fre-
quent changes of channels and fees. This renders solu-
tions requiring wallets to keep up-to-date state informa-
tion about the networks infeasible. An interesting recent
solution to reduce the burden on wallets, is the deploy-
ment of route discovery servers, such as the trampoline
nodes in Lightning: these servers maintain routes so that
a wallet just needs to know how to reach the route server
nodes in its neighborhood and can then request the de-
sired route.
This paper provides an analysis of the efficiency-
privacy tradeoff of off-chain route discovery, considering
the Lightning network as a case study. In particular,
we investigate to which extent route discovery can be
efficient and effective, incentive compatible and confi-
dential. Here, confidentiality is about more than just
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Figure 1: Paper organization
the actual data that is communicated in the discovery
process, e.g., the source, the destination, or the transac-
tion size; it is also about the possible metadata that is
communicated implicitly, e.g., about the rate or time at
which transactions occur. In fact, existing cryptographic
techniques such as (9) can be used to provide data confi-
dentiality, however, as we will show in this paper, nodes
may still leak information about the frequency of trans-
actions, i.e., about their transaction rate, to other nodes
which are not on the transaction route.
We quantify the “search friction”, i.e., the cost of the
route discovery process, both analytically, deriving cost
lower bounds, as well as empirically, considering real
payment channel networks. Our results motivate re-
search into alternative economic models to provide rout-
ing incentives which come at lower search friction costs,
which we also start to discuss in this paper.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows,
see also Figure 1. We introduce a model for route dis-
covery and provide a formal analysis in Section 2, and
then report on our empirical results in Section 3. Af-
ter discussing related work in Section 4, we conclude our
contribution in Section 5.
2 Tradeoff Analysis of Route Discovery
In order to analyze the search friction and tradeoffs
of route discovery, we consider the following simplified
model. We model the offchain network as a graph of
channels: two nodes can create (and may later delete)
a payment channel between each other, to perform of-
fchain transactions. This channel may also be used by
other nodes for routing their transactions indirectly, i.e.,
using multi-hop routing. In this paper, we are primarily
interested in two properties of a channel: the fee other
nodes are charged to use this channel, and the channel
capacity (resp. liquidity), which determines the size of
the transactions it can support. This is a simplification
of actual systems such as Lightning, but captures their
essence.1
Definition 1 (Offchain Network). The offchain network
is a weighted, directed graph G(V,E), where V are the
nodes in the network and E are the channels. A channel
e ∈ E is characterized by a weight we ∈ R+ and by a
capacity wcap.
The weight we is kept general here but typically is a
function of the fee that the source node pays for an inter-
mediate channel, the channels’ age (older channels may
be assumed to be more reliable), or previous knowledge
(e.g., channels which failed in the past), among other.
The network is dynamic, i.e., channels may be added
and removed over time, fees updated, etc., and hence
nodes require mechanisms to discover the topology and
learn about updates to be able to route their transactions
through the offchain network, either explicitly or implic-
itly. For example, Lightning includes gossiping and ac-
tive probing mechanisms to allow nodes to learn about
routing fees. It is however more challenging to learn
about the capacity wcap; such information is typically
not distributed for privacy reasons and hence, finding a
path with sufficient capacity may require trial and error
(20).
More formally, a route on a topology G(V,E) from
s ∈ V to t ∈ V is a list of channels e1. · · · , en ∈ E such
that the source node of e1 is s, and the target node of en
is t and for every i, the target of ei is the source of ei+1.
A transaction in the network is a payment from a source
to a target along a “valid route”: A route can serve a
transaction of size l if every channel e along the route
has enough capacity, i.e. ecap ≥ l. We assume that the
weight of a route is simply the sum of the weights of its
channels.
Inspired by existing offchain networks such as Light-
ning, we distinguish between two types of nodes: wallets
and “regular nodes”, henceforth called trampoline nodes
(TNs). Wallets are simple nodes and do not have the re-
sources to store (and maintain!) information about the
entire network. Rather, they need to rely on the tram-
poline nodes which know the network and which may
inform wallets about routes upon request. We are in-
terested in exactly this discovery process, where wallets
interact with one or multiple trampoline nodes to find
routes for their later transactions.
This route discovery process however introduces the
following challenges:
• Strategic behavior and efficiency: Trampoline nodes
may act selfishly and may only have an incentive
to share routes which include themselves, such that
they can charge the fee. As a consequence, a wallet
may not learn about the most efficient (i.e., lowest
cost) route.
• Effectiveness: Also related to the above, wallets
may have to invest more resources into the discov-
1E.g., nodes can set min/max values for channels, create
non-public channels which cannot be used for multihop rout-
ing, etc.
ery of efficient routes, exploring additional alter-
native trampoline nodes. The effectiveness of this
route discovery process is further affected by the fact
that not all the discovered routes may provide suffi-
cient liquidity (i.e., capacity) for a large transaction
which needs to be routed.
• Privacy: Through the repeated interactions with
multiple trampoline nodes, querying for specific
routes, a wallet may reveal confidential information
about its transactions.
We are interested in the following family of route dis-
covery algorithms:
Definition 2 (Routing Discovery Algorithm (RDA)). A
q-route discovery algorithm (RDA) is an algorithm that
given a pair s, t ∈ V , performs at most q queries, issued
to q trampoline nodes, and either returns a valid route
or decides that this is not possible.
We measure the quality, i.e., the efficiency, of a route
found by the RDA, by comparing it to the optimal route
with respect to the weight function on the topology.
Definition 3 (Efficiency). The efficiency of a route R
from s to t is defined by the stretch, i.e.,
w(Rsrc,dst)
w(Osrc,dst)
,
where w(·) is the weight of the route, and Osrc,dst is the
route with the minimal weight between s to t. The weight
of a route is the sum of its link weights.
As discussed above, some routes in off-chain networks
may be temporarily unavailable (e.g., due to offline nodes
or lack of liquidity) and thus invalidate the result of the
RDA. Another important metric to evaluate RDA hence
concerns the number of queries it needs to issue until a
valid route is discovered. For example, in the Lightning
network, an available route is searched as part of the
route initialization procedure. This process locks the
channels along the route (a designated amount) and the
channel commits to participate in the transaction.
Definition 4 (Effectiveness). The effectiveness of an
RDA is the number of queries which have to be issued to
successfully execute a given transaction.
Furthermore, as transactions are privacy critical, the
RDA should not leak any confidential information. Nat-
urally, a first concern regards the information provided
by the query directly, including e.g., source and destina-
tion nodes, potentially the transaction size, the resulting
routes, etc. As discussed above, today we understand
fairly well how to protect such information, e.g., using
homomorphic encryption schemes and private informa-
tion retrieval (14; 7; 5; 9). However, there is another con-
cern, related to the meta-data revealed from the query,
e.g., the timestamp or even the existence of the route dis-
covery query itself. While there also exist solutions to
metadata private messaging systems, e.g., (11; 12; 19)),
we will show in the following that there is an inherent
limitation what can be achieved in terms of an efficient
and confidential route discovery. To this end, we intro-
duce the notion of leak rate: to what extent can a node
learn about the number of transactions in the network
Figure 2: An attacker can learn about a transaction al-
though the request itself does not hold any information.
in a given time unit? That is, the leak rate is defined
as the number of transactions in a single time unit that
a node can learn about for a given set of transactions T
under a given route discovery algorithm A.
Definition 5 (Leak Rate). An RDA A leaks at rate k if
in order to route a transaction, k times more nodes will
learn about the existence of this transaction compared to
a scenario where the transaction is simply routed along
the shortest path (e.g., using source routing).
To clarify and motivate this notion, we give an exam-
ple in Figure 2. In this simple network, a node learns
about a transaction it should in principle have no idea
about.
Efficiency. With these concepts in mind, we now first
analyze the efficiency achievable by route discovery al-
gorithms. The following lemma shows an inherent cost
of the route discovery process in the off-chain model
Lemma 1. For every q-RDA and every M ∈ R there
exists a topology in which an RDA will return a route
with weight M times higher than the optimal route, or it
will not return a route at all.
Proof. Consider the topology in Figure 3. Given a q-
RDA A, we build a topology in which A will return a
route with weight larger than M although there exists a
route with weight 1. In our topology, the source node,
s, is in the center, and is connected to q + 1 TNs with
channel weight 0. Each TN is connected to one unique
node with a channel of weight 1, and all these nodes form
a clique (i.e., are connected to one another) by channels
of weight M . We will choose the target from one of these
nodes. The RDA A queries q TNs in an order that is
independent on target node (because s does not know the
topology). But there are q+ 1 possibilities to the target,
therefore there exists a node in the outer circle, t, that
A does not query its direct TN neighbor. Choose this t
to be our target. As the TNs are selfish, therefore they
will tell A only about routes that go through themselves,
and all of them are not directly connected to t; thus all
the weights that A sees are at least of weight M + 1.
Finally, A will return either a route with weight M + 1
or no route at all, although the actual shortest route is
of weight 1.
Figure 3: Example with high cost: If there are q + 1
direct neighbors, then any q-RDA struggles to find an
efficient route.
In general, the efficiency will depend on the specific
topology. To give an example, consider the complete
network.
Example 1. In a clique where all the weights are equal,
the efficiency, in terms of the stretch, is upper bounded
by 2.
To see this, assume r is the weight of each channel.
The optimal route is the direct channel, which weighs r.
On the other hand, the route to each TN and the route
from the TN to each target are also r (this is clique, so
there exists a direct channel), which is 2r in total.
Effectiveness. We next consider the effectiveness a
route discovery algorithm can achieve. Also here, we
first derive a negative result for the general scenario.
Lemma 2. For every q-RDA and every M ∈ R, there
exists a topology in which the first M routes from the
algorithm will be unsuccessful.
Proof. As in Lemma 1, we will build a topology in which
the effectiveness of the RDA A will be as needed. The
topology is composed from M+2 nodes: M nodes form a
clique, one of the nodes in the clique is a TN, to which the
source is connected, and the target is connected to other
node from the clique. There are
∑M−2
k=0
(
M−2
k
)
k! unique
routes in the clique. A is not aware to the availability of
the channels in the topology, therefore it offers the routes
in an order which is independent to it. Now, define the
channels to be unavailable in any of the first M routes.
Therefore the first M routes that A will offer will be
unavailable.
Again, more specific networks can provide better guar-
antees.
Example 2. In a scale-free network with n nodes, where
all the channels are bi-directional, and where p is the
probability that a channel has sufficient capacity, an q-
RDA that queries the highest degrees nodes succeeds with
a probability of at least 1− (1− p 2·log(n)log log(n) )n·(1−2−q). For
example, if a channel accepts a route independently w.p.
p = 0.2, for a network of size n = 4000 (e.g., Light-
ning), when the RDA queries only q = 5 TNs, then the
probability to get at least one effective route is ≥ 0.999.
To see this, note that the diameter of this network
is log(n)log log(n) (following (3)), therefore the length of the
path from every source to every TN, and then from the
TN to the target is bounded by 2 · log(n)log log(n) . Therefore,
the probability for each TN’s suggestion to route the
transaction is at least p2·
log(n)
log log(n) . Moreover, the number
of paths from TN to a target is at least its degree, and
the total degrees of the q nodes with the largest degree
is n · ( 12 + 14 + · · ·+ 12q ) = n · (1− 2−q).
Confidentially. To which extent can we avoid rate
leakage of the route discovery algorithm? The follow-
ing lemma shows that if nodes behave strategically, we
cannot upper bound the leaking rate of a route discovery
algorithm.
Lemma 3. For every q-RDA, and every M ∈ R there
exists a topology in which the algorithm leaks at rate
min{M, q}.
Proof. The proof is similar to the proof of Lemma 1,
however, rather than worrying about the weight of the
discovered route, we only worry about the existence of a
valid route. Therefore, we will define our topology with a
set of disconnected nodes, among the nodes in the outer
circle (instead of clique). More specifically, our topology
is simply a star topology, where the source is in the cen-
ter, its neighbors are M TNs, and their neighbors are
the possible targets (and they are all sinks, i.e. without
outgoing channels). Clearly, if the RDA A will query a
TN which is not the direct neighbor of the target, then
it will return nothing (because there is no route). Let
us choose our target to be the node that is connected to
the M ’th TN that A queries. If M < q then the A will
query M TNs until it will find a valid route; otherwise it
will stop after querying q nodes unsuccessfully. In either
way, A queries min{M, q} TNs.
Example 3. In scale free networks, the number of
queries that we need to perform in order to find a “good”
route is small.
For example, in terms of betweenness, in a scale free
network with n nodes, a node with degree n ·2−k partici-
pates in 2−k of the shortest routes (10). Therefore if the
highest degree nodes are TN, and we ask the top k, then
the TN will be on the optimal route to the target w.p.
1 − 2−k. Therefore the number of queries that we need
to do in order to find an optimal route is exponentially
small compared to the number of nodes in the topology.
3 Empirical Evaluation
In order to complement our theoretical results and in
order to study the efficiency, effectiveness and confiden-
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Figure 4: The percentage of nodes as a function of the
neighborhood size in sparse topology.
tiality tradeoff in real networks, we consider the Light-
ning network as a case study for our experiments in the
following.
3.1 Methodology
Following the Lightning network RFC regarding tram-
poline nodes2, we assume that a wallet node stores its
local knowledge on close trampoline nodes (TN) in the
network, and can search for them within a close neigh-
borhood. The wallet then queries some of the TNs for a
route to the desired target, and will finally use the route
with the lowest weight.
Collected data. We collected data about the Light-
ning network using a live Lightning node (lnd) which
is connected to the mainnet through bitcoind. To
extract the network structure (currently, the whole
topology is stored by all nodes) we use the command
lncli describegraph. The data used for this paper was
retrieved on March 24th 2020, and provides information
about the public channels.
Topologies. We consider two topologies in our experi-
ments: The first is the Lightning network snapshot, and
the second is a synthetic sparse topology that was built
using the following algorithm: create 1000 nodes in a
circle, add one outgoing channel from each node to the
node next to it, and another channel to other random
node (total of 2 outgoing channels). The fee is the same
for all the channels and equals to 1. Figures 4, 5 show
the number of nodes as a function of the neighborhood
size in the two topologies.
Graph weights. The weights of the edges in the Light-
ning network’s graph are determined by the transaction
size. Each channel determines base and proportional
fee, and the final fee is base fee + transaction size ×
proportional fee. Moreover, the fees are calculated
backward from the target to the source, because the
nodes should pay the fee for transferring the fees to the
later intermediate nodes. We decided to neglect this
backward computation due to the fact that practically
(following our previous works) it does not change the
routes. In addition, we determined the transactions’ size
to be 106 milisatoshis. We finally determine the weight
of each channel to be base fee+106×proportional fee.
2 see https://github.com/lightningnetwork/
lightning-rfc/pull/654
                     
 1 X P E H U  R I  K R S V
    
    
    
    
    
 3 H
 U F
 H Q
 W D
 J H
  R
 I  Q
 R G
 H V
 $ Y H U D J H  Q H L J K E R U K R R G  V L ] H   O L J K W Q L Q J 
Figure 5: The percentage of nodes as a function of the
neighborhood size in the Lightning network’s topology.
Transactions distribution. In the following, we as-
sumed that transactions follow two possible distribu-
tions: (i) one where all pairs of nodes in the network
attempt to create a transaction and (ii) one where there
are nodes with higher probability to execute a transac-
tion (higher “activity level”). In the latter case, we de-
termine a power-law distribution and grant it uniformly
to the nodes. In particular, we uniformly partition the
nodes to groups of size 100, and give the i’th group an
activity level of 2−i. Note that we need to model the
transactions because transactions in the Lightning net-
work are private by design. It is hard to infer the real dis-
tribution of the transactions since (i) information about
transactions is hidden in the private state of channels
and since (ii) routes are obscured by onion encryption.
Implementation details. We used the FloydWarshall
all pairs shortest path algorithm to compute the optimal
routes. Moreover, in order to keep shortest paths by lim-
iting the number of neighborhood sizes (for example to
search for the weight to the trampoline nodes in a neigh-
borhood with a certain size), we used the “min-plus ma-
trix multiplication” (or “distance product”) algorithm,
and stored the weights matrices for each number of hops.
Finally, to find all the paths between specific source to
target, we used the python module networkx.
3.2 Tradeoff Evaluation
Efficiency-Confidentiality Tradeoff We first evalu-
ate the efficiency of the routes, depending on the neigh-
borhoods in which trampoline nodes are searched. We
already know from Lemma 1 that the efficiency can
be low in the worst case, and we are now interested
the efficiency in our specific examined topologies. The
efficiency-confidentiality tradeoff can help a wallet to de-
cide on the neighborhood size that it should query in
order to find an efficient route.
We first consider our synthetic sparse topology: Fig-
ure 6 shows that the efficiency in small neighborhoods is
better only because we cannot find many routes in this
scenario. In the sparse topology this makes sense: there
are less edges, therefore if there is a TN in a close neigh-
borhood, then the optimal route goes through it with
higher probability. For the Lightning network topology,
in Figure 7. we can see that nodes find more TNs in their
close neighborhoods, but the weights are far from opti-
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Figure 6: The probability to not find a route compared
to the found route.
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Figure 7: The probability to not find a route compared
to the found route.
mal. One possible reason is that the topology is scale-
free, therefore close neighborhoods are crowded, and the
routes and the TN that the node finds are not on the
optimal route.
Effectiveness-Confidentiality Tradeoff We next ex-
amine the RDA’s effectiveness, i.e., the case in which the
routes may be unavailable. As we showed in Lemma 2,
highly ineffective queries may result when TNs offer un-
available routes, in which case the wallet will have to
query many TNs and lose confidentiality. The next ex-
periment explores this tradeoff by parametrizing, as be-
fore, the neighborhood size from which the wallet chooses
the TN, and by the percentage of TNs in the network.
We expect to see that as there are more TNs, the num-
ber of routes not found decreases (we will be offered more
routes) and the number of queries will increase. For each
pair of nodes in the topology, we ordered randomly all
the TNs in the relevant neighborhood, and queried them
one by one, each for 5 routes. Only if all the 5 routes
failed, then we queried another one.
As we discussed before, the transactions in the Light-
ning network are private, both in terms of the participat-
ing parties and the transaction size. In our experiment
we hence simulate the unavailability of the nodes by con-
sidering only the lack of liquidity. For each channel, we
simulated the occupied liquidity using a random variable
v ∼ Uniform[0, 1], and defined the already-locked liq-
uidity to be v · txsize · factor, while txsize is the transac-
tion size that we try to route, which is 106 millisatoshis.
The x-axis in the graphs indicate this factor.
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Figure 8: Privacy-effectiveness tradeoff.
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Figure 9: Privacy-effectiveness tradeoff.
In Figure 8, we fixed the probability at which a chan-
nel will accept the transaction to 60%, and examined the
number of queries that the wallet will have to execute
before finding a route that accepts the transaction. We
see that when we query bigger neighborhoods, the num-
ber of queries increases due to longer routes (which de-
creases the availability), but also more routes are found
because there are more TN to query (and thus more dis-
joint routes, i.e. different channels).
Figure 9 shows this tradeoff on the Lightning network.
As in the sparse network, we see that larger neighbor-
hoods will result in more available routes, but at the
cost of more queries. Note the curvature of the graph,
compared to the sparse topology, which shows that the
number of queries does not increase as fast when there
are more TNs. We consider this as a result of the higher
degree in the lightning network; the 3-neigborhood con-
tains almost the entire graph, thus the TNs will yield
disjoint routes which increases the probability to avail-
ability.
Effectiveness-Efficiency Tradeoff The last tradeoff
discusses the average route weight when assuming that
the routes could be unavailable. In this experiment, we
tried to route through the 10 shortest paths, and checked
the average weight and the number of pairs that did not
find any route.
Figure 10 shows the tradeoff between the fee and the
effectiveness of the route. Unlike the previous section,
where we stopped querying after we found a valid route,
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Figure 10: Efficiency-effectiveness tradeoff in the sparse
topology.
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Figure 11: fee-effectiveness tradeoff in the Lightning net-
work topology.
in here we continued to ask all the TNs, and deduce the
percentage of routes that we cannot use, and the average
fee of the one that we can. This figure also reveals an
interesting phenomenon in which the fee decreases when
the probability for availability decreases. This happens
because the available routes become shorter, and thus
the average fee decreases.
Figure 11 shows this tradeoff in the Lightning network.
We follow the same methodology of the previous section,
in which each channel accepts a transaction randomly,
as a function of the transaction size, a uniform generated
number, and a factor. It is interesting to note that the
last phenomenon that we described on the sparse topol-
ogy does not hold here. The fee increases due to the
larger number of pairs that succeed to transact. This
might suggest that either there is a single route and if it
is not available, then the transaction cannot be executed;
or there are many different routes with approximately
the same weight, which makes the unavailability of some
routes have a smaller effect on the route efficiency.
3.3 Extensions
We next explore a generalization of trampoline nodes,
which may further improve scalability. We observe that
in principle, nodes can answer path request queries also if
they just used the path. The intuition is that while nodes
will not remember the entire topology they may still have
a route cache. Let us hence consider “Partial Nodes”
(PN), nodes that share their past knowledge using the
same selfish mechanisms like TNs, when answering path
request queries.
Note that in this extension, the wallet nodes will not
benefit from a better effectiveness (just like the TNs, the
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Figure 12: Ratio of the resulting route and the optimal
with Partial Nodes (the Lightning network topology).
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Figure 13: Ratio between the resulting route and the
optimal route with Partial Nodes (the sparse topology).
PNs do not know the availability of the channels) or con-
fidentiality (because they still query the same number
of intermediate nodes). The major improvement that
partial nodes will contribute to the network is the effi-
ciency of the resulting routes. The are more nodes in
the network that share the optimal routes to the target,
therefore the “detour” of the route through the TN/PN
will be smaller. Figure 12 assumes that each PN stores
paths to 50 uniformly selected nodes. Here we fixed the
number of TNs and the neighborhood size to obtain a
clearer view of the improvement in the resulting routes.
On the other hand, Figure 13 shows the limited benefits
of “partial nodes” on the sparse topology. The effective-
ness is low due to the small number of different routes
to the target.
Finally, it is also interesting to consider the impact of
altruistic nodes, i.e. nodes that hold the entire topology
and answer route queries unselfishly. In this case, all
the nodes in the network can simply query the altruistic
nodes, and get the optimal result without any cost beside
the possible lack of privacy to a small number of entities.
4 Related Work
Aspects of route discovery algorithms in off-chain net-
works were described in a SoK by Gudgeon et al.
(8), identifying effectiveness, efficiency, scalability, cost-
effectiveness and privacy as key challenges. Following
this, many suggestions were made in order to find a route
discovery algorithm. Few among these suggestions are
SpeedyMurmurs (16) and SilentWhispers (13) which fo-
cus on the effectiveness and efficiency (SpeedyMurmurs’s
simulations show that they find a route by up to two or-
ders of magnitude faster then the existing algorithms,
while maintaining the same success ratio). Unfortu-
nately, in real-world networks, they face the challenge
of cost-effectiveness that is driven by the selfishness of
the nodes.
Another suggestion was made in SpiderNetwork (17),
where the payments are split into units and the route dis-
covery algorithm routes each of them individually (sim-
ilar to packet switched network). This method however
does not account for privacy and cost-effectiveness in
selfish models. In MAPPCN (18) the authors suggest
and analyze a route discovery algorithm which preserves
privacy but which does not account of the leaking issue
addressed in this paper.
Further related research exists in other networks than
off-chain networks, e.g., on selfish routing in wireless
networks, however, there selfish nodes typically wish to
avoid participating in forwarding packets in order to not
waste energy. Another example is gaining source-target
privacy in multi-hop networks such as TOR (6).
From an economical perspective, much research ex-
ists on markets with producers that offers digital goods
(i.e. products which are infinitely expansible (15)) and
consumers with search friction (i.e. cost in addition to
the price (1)). One example is Pandora’s problem (21)
wherein Pandora needs to pay a fee to open boxes (which
is equivalent in our model to loss of privacy or additional
networking costs), and each box offers different value.
In general, our analysis is in the spirit of classic models
such as (1), as we can model the interaction between the
TN (who sells an item or service) and the wallets that
consume it. Many different scenarios of this game were
researched previously ((2), (4)), and the general result is
that the pricing in the network will rise with the search
friction.
5 Conclusion & Future Work
We modeled, analyzed and empirically evaluated the
tradeoff between efficiency, effectiveness and privacy of
route discovery in offchain networks which come with
scalability requirements and where node behave selfish.
In particular, we have shown that current solutions can
be inefficient in general, which raises interesting avenues
for future research. Another interesting direction for fu-
ture research regards the exploration of further strategic
behaviors.
We see a trampoline node as an interesting player with
different economical incentives compared to the other
nodes in the network. While the wallet has a search fric-
tion that is based on the number of queries that it needs
to perform and the resulting privacy loss, the TNs may
offer different prices that may be changed according to
the wallet’s strategy. The study of the resulting strategic
behaviors and games may provide interesting insights,
e.g., on whether overestimating the value of privacy will
motivate the TN to increase the fee of the offered route.
Moreover, the interaction between the TNs (the “sell-
ers”) and the wallets (the “buyers”) falls into the area of
trading “digital goods”, i.e. unbounded amount of prod-
ucts to sell, which is well researched. As far as we know,
this research was never combined with search-friction for
the buyers, as in our case. This indeed makes sense in
“traditional” digital goods (such as servers that offer files
to download), but when considering privacy and band-
width, as in this paper, this could be a very interesting
extension. It could further be interesting to broaden the
discussion to strategic behaviors which lead TNs to route
transactions through worse routes in order to manage
liquidity in the TN’s channels.
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